quinta-feira, 13 de novembro de 2025

África - Guerra & História - ‘LANDMINES IN MOZAMBIQUE’ - London 1994 - MUITO RARO;










África - Guerra & História - Um pormenorizado estudos sobre a situação dos campos de minas em Moçambique após uma guerra colonial com Portugal, em que quer o exército quer a guerrilha da FRELIMO usaram a colocação de minas como arma de guerra, para após a independência o conflito se intensificar com o regime minoritário branco da Rhodesia / Zimbabwe e após 1980 o exército de Mugabe ter auxiliado o governo moçambicano contra a guerrilha da RENAMO usando também a colocação de minas anti pessoais …


‘LANDMINES IN MOZAMBIQUE’ 
Edited by Human Rights Watch / Africa 
London 1994 


Livro com 120 páginas, ilustrado e em muito bom estado de conservação. Excelente. 
De muito difícil localização. 
MUITO RARO.


Summary:
“Land mines in Mozambique are still causing death and injuries years after the initial dispute. Since 1980, 3400 people have had an amputation because of land mine injuries. However, there are no direct estimates of the number of deaths or casualties which are not treated in hospitals.
In March, 1994, a medical team assembled by Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) conducted household surveys in the province of Manica and in the sub-district of Metuchira, province of Sofala. The object was to assess the frequency and severity of injuries and mortality caused by land mines in the civilian population. We found ratios of 8·1 and 16·7 casualties per 1000 living people in Manica and Metuchira, respectively. The prevalence of amputees was 3·2 per 1000 in Manica, and 2·3 in Metuchira. These figures are several folds higher than suggested by hospital data. The case fatality rate was 48%. Most of the victims were civilians (68%) and were injured by antipersonnel mines (81%). 16% of victims were women, and 7% were under 15 years of age.
Our results suggest that the impact of land mines is substantially higher than originally thought.”


Human Rights Developments:
“In its second year of peace, following the October 4, 1992 General Peace Accord, the overall human rights situation continued to improve and culminated in Mozambique's first multi-party election. Restricted freedom of movement and expression in some areas controlled by the former rebel Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) and appalling prison conditions and intimidation in some areas of RENAMO supporters by the paramilitary Rapid Intervention Police were the main concerns.

The first ever democratic elections were held on October 27-29, with voter turnout above 85 percent despite RENAMO's abortive and short-lived day-long boycott of the first day of voting. With 95 percent of the votes counted at time of writing the ruling Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) took 45 percent in the parliamentary elections, giving it 129 out of 250 seats. RENAMO got 38 percent, gaining 112 seats. The Democratic Union, a rightest opposition party won nine seats. Joaquim Chissano, the current president was the winner in the presidential race, with 54 percent of the vote (compared to 34 percent for RENAMO leader Alfonso Dhlakama). On November 14, Dhlakama phoned U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to accept the election results and announced that he was prepared to cooperate with the government in the post-election era.

The election campaign began officially on September 22 and over 5.2 million people registered to vote. It saw little violence and a low key campaign was conducted by both sides, although there was some intimidation by both in their stronghold areas. The south and far north voted for Chissano and FRELIMO while the central provinces of Manica and Sofala for RENAMO. The results in the strategic provinces of Nampula and Zambezia, where 41 percent of the electorate were registered, were close, neighboring villages often voting for opposing candidates.

The war and experience of human rights abuses played a role in the electoral outcome. In northern Mozambique, RENAMO campaigned to politicize villagers and in some areas sought to make amends for past brutalities. In some districts of Zambezi province RENAMO transferred a number of officers with particularly brutal reputations out of the vicinity, and apologized for past brutalities. In the far south, the scene of many massacres by RENAMO in the 1980s, the electorate overwhelmingly rejected the former rebels, to the extent that even RENAMO controlled zones voted for Chissano and FRELIMO.

Human rights protection remained a low priority at official levels and will probably not feature highly in the policies of the new government. Some sort of accommodation between the two main contending parties is likely and past records of human rights abuses are being ignored. There are no plans for a "Truth Commission," or accountability for past human rights abuses.

The appointment on April 6 of Lieutenant General Lagos Lidimo (by the government) and Lieutenant General Mateus Ngonhamo (by RENAMO) as joint heads of the new Armed Defense Forces of Mozambique (FADM) army is a good indication of this approach. Lagos Lidimo in particular has a reputation for brutality in the late 1980s in operations against RENAMO in Zambezia province.

The official demobilization process for former combatants has been completed, although there are still former soldiers who failed to register. The forty-nine U.N.-run assembly points closed their doors to new arrivals on August 15. ONUMOZ, United Nations Operations in Mozambique, had registered 64,130 government troops and 18,227 RENAMO soldiers. Of these, 7,774 troops have moved to the training camps for the FADM. The total of the new army may reach 12,000, but this is far less than the 30,000 strong army envisaged in the 1992 GPA. Most notable is that the majority of soldiers from both sides wanted to be demobilized and appeared to have no interest in being in the future army.

A notable development in 1994 was the collapse of discipline amongst rank and file RENAMO soldiers toward their leadership, reflected in a significant increase in mutinies and in beatings of their senior military leaders. For example on June 1, RENAMO's Brigadier General Raul Dick was badly beaten by his men in Mocubela Assembly Area when he tried to mediate a dispute about poor conditions. In June and July there were over thirty incidents of soldiers mutinying, often by setting up road blocks and holding civilians hostage until their demands were heard.

Re-integration into civilian society of these demobilized soldiers was one of the greatest challenges for the new post-election government. There was widespread concern that a lack of employment prospects will result in economic and socially induced banditry.

During his first ever U.S. visit in June, RENAMO leader Dhlakama admitted for the first time that RENAMO had in the past recruited child combatants. There were over 2,000 child soldiers known to international nongovernmental organizations in May. According to a UNICEF survey of the problem at this time "these children are under military supervision, kept in tightly guarded bases within RENAMO's strongest military zones." By September RENAMO had began to fully assist in permitting these children to leave. These children have been problematic for RENAMO, not least because there have been several incidents in which they went on strike demanding benefits equal to those of adult soldiers. Human Rights Watch interviewed several child soldiers in October just after the elections. Having already lost their families, they also felt betrayed by RENAMO, which they said had "dropped" them. Child combatants have been regarded as unassembled troops by the U.N. and are not eligible for the same sort of benefits that assembled soldiers receive.

The government has continued to build up its paramilitary police force, the Rapid Intervention Police. This force is some 2,000 strong, made up of former army and security personnel, and has a reputation for intimidation and heavy-handed tactics. On October 23 Human Rights Watch witnessed the Rapid Intervention Police use excessive violence against civilians in unrest following the end of a RENAMO electoral rally at Xai Xai.

There remain large quantities of arms cached across the country. A typical arms cache seen by Human Rights Watch in October included six AK-47s, six hand grenades, one RPG-7, and two PMN anti-personnel mines. These had been stored in greased cloth. ONUMOZ officials admit that there are literally millions of guns still in circulation and that both sides have been stockpiling their better weaponry. In September there was a stand-off between the government and ONUMOZ when the U.N. established that there was a massive arsenal of undeclared weaponry, including hundreds of landmines, in storage under the Ministry of Interior in Maputo. After some tense discussions, the U.N. allowed the government to register the arsenal.

Reports of appalling prison conditions and detention without trial continue to be received. There is currently a two year back-log in court hearings that is stalling the judicial process. U.N. Civilian Police monitors (Civpol), whose mandate includes prison visits, spoke of poor conditions, cases of forced labor and incidents of rape by police of inmates in the prisons visited. RENAMO continued to deny complete free movement in its zones, although this situation had gradually improved throughout 1994. In October several informants told Human Rights Watch that they had recently joined RENAMO in exchange for gaining the freedom of their relatives.”



Do ÍNDICE: / TABLE OF CONTENTS: 

Acknowledgments 

PREFACE 

1. - INTRODUCTION 

2. - BACKGROUND 
- Colonial Rule 
- Independence 
- The War 
- Peace Negotiations 

3. - THE MINES 
- Number and Location of Landmines 
- Mine Types and Sources 
Antipersonnel landmines 
Antitank landmines 
- Landmine Use--Tactics and Strategies 
Renamo Use of Landmines 
Government Use of Landmines 
Use of IEDs and Booby-Traps 
Other Users of Landmines 
- Landmine Training 
Renamo 
Government 
- Landmine Records 

4. - THE HUMAN COST 
- The Victims 
- Case Studies 
Mine Locations 
Mine Warnings 
Poor Clearance 
- NGO and U.N. Mine Incidents 
- Emergency Care for the Injured 
- Hospital Treatment 
- Rehabilitation 
ICRC Activities 
Handicap International Activities 
- Need for funding for mine victims 

5. - THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACT 
- Repatriation 
The Mine Threat 
- Mine Awareness Initiatives 
- Economic Implications 
- Social Plight of Victims 

6. - MINE CLEARANCE INITIATIVES 
- GSG Pilot Project 
- The U.N. Mine Clearance Plan 
- Mine Clearance Delays 
- Priority Road Clearance 
- NPA Clearance in Tete 
- Recent Progress 
U.N. Mine Clearance Training Center 
- Funding for Mine Clearance 
U.S. AID 
U.S. DoD 
Mine-Tech 
Mecam 
- Independent Mine Clearance by the Government and Renamo 
- NGO Mine Clearance Initiatives 
Halo Trust 
Mines Advisory Group 

7. - INTERNATIONAL LAW GOVERNING LANDMINES 
- International Disarmament Law 
- International Humanitarian Law 
International Customary Law 
Direct Attacks on Noncombatants 
Indiscriminate Attacks 
Military Utility Versus Humanitarian
Costs 
- The Landmines Protocol 

8. - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
- Conclusions 
- Recommendations 
General 
To the Mozambican Government 
To Renamo 
To the United Nations 
To Other Mine Producers and Exporters 

LANDMINE DRAWINGS 
- Soviet PMN 
- Soviet PMD-6 
- Soviet POMZ-2 
- Chinese TYPE 72 
- Italian VALMARA 69 
- U.S. M18A1 


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